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NO. 38 OCTOBER 2018 Introduction 
Organized Crime on the UN Security 
Council Agenda 
Action against Human Trafficking Reveals Opportunities and Challenges 
Judith Vorrath 
On 7 June 2018, for the first time, a Committee of the United Nations Security Council 
placed individuals on a sanctions list for human trafficking. As part of the Libya sanc-
tions regime, travel bans and asset freezes have been imposed on six individuals iden-
tified as the main perpetrators of illegal activities relating to human trafficking and 
the smuggling of migrants. The European Union and the US have already implemented 
these UN sanctions. This response is an expression of the UN Security Council’s in-
creased attention on transnational organized crime (TOC). For years, the number of 
resolutions relating to TOC, whether linked to drug or arms trafficking, piracy, kid-
nappings or illegal trade in natural resources, has increased substantially. And the 
Security Council has repeatedly dealt with human trafficking in conflict situations 
since the end of 2015. The relevant decisions show what role the Security Council can 
play in addressing organized crime, but also where pitfalls lurk. As a non-permanent 
member of the Security Council in 2019/2020, Germany should advocate a systematic 
advancement of the agenda. 
 
The UN Security Council’s sanctioning 
of six individuals, four Libyan and two Eri-
trean nationals, for human trafficking and 
migrant smuggling in this form may be a 
novelty. But organized crime issues have in-
creasingly appeared on the UN agenda for 
some years now. According to an analysis 
by the Global Initiative against Transnational 
Organized Crime, the number of Security 
Council resolutions related to organized 
crime has risen fairly steadily in the past 15 
years; in 2017, there were a total of 41. In 
recent years, the majority of these resolu-
tions dealt with Africa, and an increasing 
number with the Middle East, since the 
Security Council naturally approaches this 
problem area via threats to peace and secu-
rity. In addition, there are a number of the-
matic resolutions, including one each in 
2016 and 2017 on human trafficking in con-
flicts. 
Why is the Security Council 
tackling organized crime issues? 
The UN Security Council has targeted trans-
national crime phenomena, such as human 
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trafficking, mainly because of their asso-
ciation with armed violence and insecurity. 
This linkage can have many facets. Specifi-
cally, organized criminal activities can 
serve to finance armed groups, but also to 
strengthen their power bases, or they can 
be tactically motivated. Sexual violence and 
exploitation as well as forced recruitment 
by armed groups may be part of this. In 
some conflict countries, the boundary be-
tween the criminal and political motives of 
violent actors is increasingly blurred. 
The Security Council is tackling criminal 
phenomena also because other internation-
al approaches hardly take effect in such 
contexts. Indeed, the Convention on Trans-
national Organized Crime was adopted 
by the UN General Assembly in 2000 and 
supplemented by, among others, a protocol 
on trafficking in persons, and it now has 
189 parties. But not only is the implemen-
tation of this Convention, which does not 
yet have a review mechanism, faltering; 
fragile and conflict-affected states which 
are usually weak in prosecuting organized 
crime anyway, are rarely actively engaged 
in international cooperation. In an environ-
ment like that of Libya, even differentiating 
between criminal actors and officials who 
are supposed to be enforcing the law is dif-
ficult, as the case of the UN-sanctioned 
commander of the regional coastguard in 
Zawiya shows. 
It is often individual events or conflict 
situations that initially put organized crime 
issues on the Security Council’s agenda. 
For example, the kidnapping of women and 
children and the trafficking of persons be-
longing to the Yazidi minority by the ‘Is-
lamic State’ (ISIL) was a crucial catalyst for 
the first Security Council thematic debate 
on human trafficking in situations of con-
flict in December 2015. These events played 
a key role in the meeting and were specifi-
cally condemned in the resolution passed 
a year later. With the open and systematic 
exploitation of people by ISIL, a new dimen-
sion had been reached. 
At the same time, this case shows the 
extent to which action against criminal 
activities and networks in conflict situa-
tions has been linked to the fight against 
transnational terrorism. Many of the reso-
lutions adopted in the past three years that 
actually contain the term “organized crime” 
also refer to terrorism. The connection be-
tween the two phenomena is the subject of 
UN Security Council Resolution 2195 from 
2014 and is often established in the context 
of Libya and the Sahel region, in particular 
Mali. It is, therefore, not surprising that the 
sanctions regime on Mali established in 
2017 also allows for the listing of persons 
or entities that support spoilers of the peace 
process with income from TOC. Although 
no sanctions have yet been imposed, in its 
recent report, the UN Panel of Experts on 
Mali examined more closely various forms 
of organized crime, including trafficking 
in persons and migrant smuggling. 
However, the resolutions of 2017 and 
those of previous years also mention up to 
11 different types of crime beyond terror-
ism, including drug and arms trafficking, 
kidnapping, armed robbery and financial 
crime. While all these offences could be 
linked to organized crime, the term itself 
does not appear in the majority of reso-
lutions. Thus, a clearly defined agenda 
for dealing with organized crime has not 
emerged. However, as the example of tar-
geted sanctions against traffickers shows, 
the Security Council does not limit itself 
to mere rhetoric. 
Not just rhetoric, but 
concrete measures 
A 2016 paper from the United Nations 
University outlines the Security Council’s 
options for action with regard to human 
trafficking in conflict with the key words, 
“Denounce, Disrupt and Protect”. 
The UN has been using sanctions for 
some time in a disruptive sense, i.e. in 
order to cut off conflict parties from illegal 
sources of income. An example of this was 
the ban on direct or indirect imports of 
rough diamonds from Sierra Leone (2000) 
and Liberia (2001). The sanctions now im-
posed for human trafficking were preceded, 
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inter alia, by measures against illegal oil 
exports from Libya and an arms embargo. It 
is not yet clear whether the recent listings 
can lastingly disrupt the networks involved 
in human trafficking through Libya. 
However, the sanctions also serve as a 
signal to other persons involved, especially 
as long as the government in Tripoli, which 
has been internationally recognized since 
2016, exercises virtually no control. This 
response to organized crime can also have 
a certain spillover effect. As embargoes like 
the one in Libya not only ideally curb the 
arms trade, but monitoring by UN Panels of 
Experts sometimes also reveals other illegal 
activities. The narrative summaries explain-
ing the listings for human trafficking and 
migrant smuggling also refer to informa-
tion gathered by the corresponding panel 
for Libya. The individual sanctions now 
imposed can, therefore, not be considered 
in isolation. 
In terms of protecting the victims of 
trafficking, an Anti-Trafficking Task Team 
has been formed as part of the global net-
work that coordinates inter-agency ap-
proaches to protecting people in humani-
tarian emergencies. In addition, the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
is developing guidelines for countering 
human trafficking in conflict areas. 
In such areas, peace missions are also 
confronted with the effects of criminal 
activity. As a result, references to organized 
crime can be increasingly found in Security 
Council resolutions on UN peacekeeping 
operations as well. When extending the 
mandates of the UN Mission in Mali 
(MINUSMA) and the assistance mission for 
Iraq and the support mission in Libya, 
human trafficking is repeatedly cited as a 
challenge. However, this has not yet lead to 
any specifically mandated tasks. A mandate 
to directly participate in combatting, for 
example drug smuggling, such as in Haiti, 
is rare anyway. It is more common to sup-
port the security forces and agencies of the 
host country, especially in the framework 
of larger, multi-dimensional missions as in 
Mali. Amongst other things, MINUSMA pro-
vides training for the Specialized Judicial 
Unit against Terrorism and Transnational 
Organized Crime. Moreover, according to a 
Security Council resolution from December 
2017, the same mission should also provide 
operational and logistical support to the 
Joint Force of the G5 Sahel states, whose 
task is to combat terrorism as well as drug 
and human trafficking across national bor-
ders. The increased attention on organized 
crime issues in the Security Council has, 
therefore, taken effect; but there are also 
some pitfalls. 
Critical points of an 
emerging agenda 
In essence, there are three aspects to con-
sider in further developing the agenda: 
Firstly, the UN Security Council does not set 
the framework for combating transnational 
organized crime. As the relevant resolutions 
emphasize, the UN Convention of 2000 
with its three supplementary protocols 
remains the main reference point. For 
example, the protocol on trafficking in 
persons provides a broad definition of the 
offence that the Security Council must 
consistently use as a benchmark. Moreover, 
a distinction needs to be made between 
human trafficking and migrant smuggling, 
which are the subject of two separate sup-
plementary protocols to the convention. 
Quasi-legislative interventions by the Secu-
rity Council, as with regard to the control 
of the proliferation of weapons of mass de-
struction, are neither realistic nor reason-
able on this issue. Rather, it is important to 
have a more systematic debate in the Secu-
rity Council that goes beyond specific forms 
of crime or the nexus of organized crime 
and terrorism. Given the complexity of 
organized crime phenomena, the agenda-
setting is inevitably selective, but the per-
ception of the threat to peace and security 
from organized crime should not be. 
Secondly, since the criminalization of 
certain actors in conflict areas can also be 
politically motivated, sound justifications 
are required for any action undertaken. 
Looking at the resolutions passed in the last 
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ten years shows that the range of particular 
crimes mentioned remains fairly similar 
over time. It is not surprising that a greater 
focus is placed on arms trafficking and ter-
rorism or kidnappings than, say, drug traf-
ficking, since the link between these crimes 
and organized violent actors tends to be more 
direct. Yet, it is by no means automatic. 
The Security Council Committee has jus-
tified the recent sanctions on traffickers in 
Libya by referring to their connections with 
armed groups and, primarily, their respon-
sibility for human rights violations against 
migrants, particularly in detention camps. 
Not only information provided by the UN 
Panel of Experts on Libya, but also findings 
from Western criminal prosecution author-
ities pointed to the role played by the indi-
viduals now listed by the Security Council. 
The exploitation and abuse of migrants in 
Libya has generally been well documented. 
The precise categorization of crimes in 
such contexts, however, is difficult because 
human trafficking is not only defined by 
the actual act and the means employed, but 
also by the intention of the perpetrator. In 
addition, the links to violence and violent 
actors are often less clear with other organ-
ized crime phenomena. Consequently, 
structures such as the UN Panels of Experts 
and the analysis cells in UN peacekeeping 
missions should be strengthened and better 
used. Above all, this could help throw light 
on criminal activities and groups not in 
isolation, but as part of the political econo-
my of conflicts – also with regard to trans-
national networks and financial flows. 
Thirdly, building on this, measures to 
be adopted by the Security Council could 
be better coordinated, particularly when it 
comes to meaningfully combining different 
instruments, because sanctions are, as men-
tioned, only one – often limited – option. 
Different approaches can quickly counter-
act each other, for example if a repressive 
approach to trafficking hampers the pro-
tection of victims. Particularly in cases where 
UN or Western states classify important 
criminal actors as terrorists, measures will 
often include military action, as in the case 
of the G5 Joint Sahel Force. A police com-
ponent should be attached to it, but so 
far does not exist. Particularly in the case 
of regional initiatives it supports or has 
authorized, the Security Council should 
insist that interventions are not mostly 
military. This is all the more true for UN 
peacekeeping missions where police com-
ponents become more important. To 
strengthen these Germany can make spe-
cific contributions to personnel. Member-
ship of the Security Council in 2019/20 also 
provides an opportunity for Germany to 
address organized crime threats more regu-
larly and systematically. One important 
step forward would be to ensure that meas-
ures put to the vote do not, at the very 
least, bolster organized crime in the specific 
conflict context. 
Dr Judith Vorrath is a Senior Associate in SWP’s International Security Division. 
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